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THE DIMINISHED TRIAL
Nora Freeman Engstrom*
INTRODUCTION
The civil trial is vanishing. In 1938, trials resolved roughly 20 percent of
civil cases in federal court.1 By 1990, only 4.3 percent of federal civil filings
reached trial.2 By 2000, a mere 2.2 percent did.3 And, most recently, in
2016, the civil trial rate was halved again.4 Over the past twenty years,
between 1997 and 2016, the number of civil trials in the nation’s federal
courts dropped 62 percent.5 Another way to look at it: Federal courts
conducted half as many civil trials in 2016 than they did in 1962, even while
disposing of over five times as many civil cases.6
At the state level, where the vast majority (perhaps 98 percent) of civil
litigation takes place, trial rates are lower still.7 The National Center for State
* Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Curriculum, and Deane F. Johnson Faculty Scholar,
Stanford Law School. This Article was prepared for the Colloquium entitled Access to Justice
and the Legal Profession in an Era of Contracting Civil Liability, hosted by the Fordham Law
Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 27, 2017, at Fordham University
School of Law. I am grateful to Nathan Werksman for excellent research assistance, and I am
indebted to the attendees of the Colloquium for their insightful comments and suggestions.
1. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
WIS. L. REV. 631, 633.
2. Id.
3. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2000
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 159 tbl.C-4 (2000), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/statistics_import_dir/c04sep00.pdf [https://perma.cc/SRV4-NGRH]. Note that,
as discussed in more detail below, this table (“Table C-4”) defines a trial as “a contested
proceeding at which evidence is introduced” and therefore counts as “trials” certain events
which we might not believe truly qualify (e.g., a contested hearing to determine whether to
issue a restraining order). See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461
(2004).
4. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2016
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.C-4 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 ANNUAL REPORT],
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c4_0930.2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G8GT-FKU4].
5. Compare id., with ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 152 tbl.C-4 (1997),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/c04sep97.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YTP5-QMQ5].
6. The federal courts tried 5802 civil cases in 1962 compared to 2781 today, while
disposing of 50,320 civil cases in 1962 compared to 271,302 today. Compare 2016 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 4, tbl.C-4, with Galanter, supra note 3, at 462 tbl.1.
7. See ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 85 (2011) (estimating that
98 percent of trials occur at the state level). To be sure, less is known about state trial rates
because, as one commentator succinctly explains, “[s]tate-court data is more limited, harder
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Courts (NCSC) reports that, in 2016, the percentage of civil cases resolved
by jury trial ranged from .05 percent to .50 percent in the twenty-four
jurisdictions studied.8 In these states, as on the federal level, the trend is
sharply downward: From 2000 to 2009, for example, the percentage of state
civil jury trials dropped a stunning 47.5 percent.9
Zeroing in on individual jurisdictions reveals a picture that is particularly
stark. The entire state of West Virginia saw twenty-one federal civil trials
(bench and jury) in 2016.10 Wyoming saw eight.11 Alaska saw three.12 And
Vermont saw two.13 The story in states is similar. In Iowa in 2014, for
example, there were thirteen counties where no trial verdicts were entered
whatsoever, and there were sixty-one counties with three or fewer jury
verdicts (whether in civil or criminal cases).14
So, trials are disappearing. That fact is as disturbing as it is consequential,
and it has captured our collective attention, as we “mourn” and “lament” the
civil trials’ demise.15 Further, we not only mourn. We also painstakingly
and resolutely study: Lots of attention has been paid to charting, analyzing,
and understanding these arresting trends.16
to collect, and difficult to compare.” Nathan L. Hecht, The Vanishing Civil Jury Trial: Trends
in Texas Courts and an Uncertain Future, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 164 (2005).
8. 2016 Civil Caseloads—Trial Courts: 2016 Civil Jury Trials and Rates, NAT’L CTR.
FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/Sitecore/Content/Microsites/PopUp/Home/CSP/CSP_Intro
[https://perma.cc/L836-WD76] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). The NCSC counts a proceeding
as a “trial” as long as “the jury has been sworn, regardless of whether a verdict is reached.” Id.
(quoting COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE COURT GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING 38
(2017),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/State%20Court%20
Guide%20to%20Statistical%20Reporting%20v%202point1point2.ashx
[https://perma.cc/NV9R-6HVJ]).
9. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., A RETURN TO TRIALS:
IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE SHORT, SUMMARY, AND EXPEDITED CIVIL ACTION PROGRAMS 1 n.1
(2012),
http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/a_return_to_trials_
implementing_effective_short_summary_and_expedited_civil_action_programs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SG3W-P2JE]. But cf. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Trials and Tribulations of
Counting “Trials,” 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 415, 421 (2013) (suggesting that, for a number of
reasons, we ought to interpret statistics showing declining trial rates with caution).
10. 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, tbl.C-4A.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Number of Iowa Civil Jury Trials Continues to Decline, IOWA ST. B. ASS’N (Mar. 18,
2015), http://www.iowabar.org/?page=CivilJuryDecline [https://perma.cc/38V6-9L3Q].
15. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Where Have You Gone, Spot Mozingo? A Trial Judge’s
Lament over the Demise of the Civil Jury Trial, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 99, 99 (2010); Stephen D.
Susman & Thomas M. Melscheimer, Trial by Agreement: How Trial Lawyers Hold the Key
to Improving Jury Trials in Civil Cases, 32 REV. LITIG. 431, 434 (2013). Judge Patrick
Higginbotham notes:
Over the past two decades, awareness of the decline of trials has crept slowly into
the collective judicial consciousness. What most judges passed over as a temporary
phenomenon brought on by dynamic dockets or by circumstances in a particular
geographic region has now been recognized as an across-the-board change, albeit
one that came on slowly at first.
Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60 DUKE
L.J. 745, 748 (2010).
16. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 7, at 82–111; CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS & STATE JUSTICE INST., THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE
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But that might not be the half of it. This Article suggests that the other part
of the story is that trials are not only vanishing. The few that remain also
appear to be shrinking. Influenced by what Judith Resnik long ago dubbed
“managerial judging”—a willingness on the part of trial judges to take ad
hoc, improvisational action in the name of administrative efficiency and
effective docket management—judges seem to be taking a more active role
during trials in an effort to speed these proceedings along.17 As they do, trials
seem to be undergoing a subtle metamorphosis: becoming shorter, more
regimented, subject to less party control, and more affected by particular
judicial whims.18
This transformation is important in its own right. And it is particularly
impactful because of the interaction between the two trends. As the number
of trials dwindles, the few that are left have an outsized and ever-larger
effect—when it comes to enforcing laws, setting precedent, establishing
settlement rates, promoting accountability and transparency, and, more
broadly, shaping Americans’ interactions with, and conception of, the civil
justice system.19
This Article thus highlights the need for a much larger inquiry into not only
what is happening to trials but also what is happening in those that remain.
Part I draws together statistics that suggest that trials are changing: Short
trials (of one day) are becoming relatively more common, while long trials
(of twenty days or more) are becoming less common.20 Part II then identifies
COURTS, at iii–vi, 25–28 (2017), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Research/
CivilJusticeReport-2015.ashx [https://perma.cc/3YQX-GW92]; ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN
PRAISE OF LITIGATION 14–15, 21–29 (2017); Galanter, supra note 3, at 459; Hecht, supra note
7, at 166–81; John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122
YALE L.J. 522, 522 (2012).
17. See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
Elaborating on the concept, E. Donald Elliott explains: “Managerial judges believe that the
system does not work; that something must be done to make it work; and that the only plausible
solution to the problem is ad hoc procedural activism by judges.” E. Donald Elliott,
Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 309 (1986).
18. “Managerial judging” was initially conceived of as affecting only the pretrial and posttrial period. See Resnik, supra note 17, at 377. Thus, to quote John Langbein, it was assumed
that managerial judging left “adversary domination of the trial (especially jury trial) largely
unaffected.” John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 859 (1985). As judges’ turn to management has become better understood, however,
many have recognized that judges’ activism in the name of efficiency has not just affected the
pretrial or post-trial period. Rather, it has significantly and consequentially affected the trial
itself. See, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Trouble with Trial Time Limits, 106 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2018) (on file with author); Richard L. Marcus, Reining in the American
Litigator: The New Role of American Judges, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 3, 23
(2003); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial Judge Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV.
1261, 1261–62 (2010).
19. See Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 201, 229–30 (“This small fraction of cases that are tried by juries . . . provide
the signals and markers that influence the outcome of a vastly larger number of cases settled
or abandoned without trial.”).
20. Note, this is different from saying that federal civil trials are getting shorter overall.
There is no clear evidence that they are—though it is true, the percentage of trials lasting three
days or less has dropped slightly over time, from 79 percent of all federal civil trials in 1983
to 75 percent in 2016. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Civil Trial Data From 1983 to 2016 (2016)
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and explores some of the factors that may explain these trends. Finally, a
brief conclusion highlights some problems with all the above and issues a
call for further study and analysis.
I. CONSIDERING TRIAL TRENDS: FEWER LONG TRIALS
AND A HIGHER PROPORTION OF SHORT TRIALS
Federal trial data points to a subtly transformed trial landscape. Our
starting point to discern changes in trial procedure is 1983, the year the Rules
Committee amended the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to make “case
management an express goal of pretrial procedure” and, some suggest, the
year managerial judging finally and firmly took hold.21 When one compares
the trials of 1983 and the current day, two changes jump out.
First, since 1983, the percentage of very short (one day) federal civil trials
increased substantially, from 46 percent in 1983 up to 54 percent in 2016.22
Thus, quite remarkably—starting in 2007 and every year since—the majority
of all federal civil trials have been wrapped up in only one day. Figure 1
below illustrates the point graphically.

(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (compiling data from Tables T-2 and C-8 from
the 1983 through 2016 Administrative Office of the United States Courts’s Director’s Annual
Reports).
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendment; see, e.g., Steven
S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 676
(2010) (“If one is looking for a turning point in the history of judicial case management in the
federal courts . . . it would be 1983 . . . .”); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 527 (1986) (suggesting that the 1983
amendments marked the official “approval” of “managerial judging”). To be sure, any year
one picks as a starting point for these trends is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, as judges did
not all embrace case management techniques en masse. Some judges embraced judicial
management in the 1970s, while Congress only added its voice to the chorus (with the passage
of the Civil Justice Reform Act) in 1990. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater:
The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 791–94 (1993).
22. Engstrom, supra note 20. During this period, the total number of federal civil trials
dropped precipitously from 14,391 in 1983 to 4572 in 2016. Id. Accompanying that
extraordinary drop, the raw number of trials lasting one day decreased as well, from 6642 in
1983 to 2471 in 2016. Id. For trial lengths prior to 1983, see Galanter, supra note 3, at 477–
78, 479 fig.11, 479 fig.12. Table T-2, the source of this data, does not include time spent in
jury deliberation; when offering the length of trial, it only tracks “judges’ time on the bench.”
Email from Sheila Barnes-Jones, Statistics Div. Staff, U.S. Judicial Data & Analysis Office,
to author (Sept. 28, 2017) (on file with author).
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Figure 1: Percentage of Civil Trials Lasting One Day in
All U.S. District Courts, Combined (1983–2016)
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The number of protracted federal civil trials (those trials lasting twenty
days or more) has also been in flux, though in the opposite direction. True,
the percentage of long trials has remained very low throughout the period,
vacillating between 0 and 1 percent of all federal civil proceedings. But the
raw numbers suggest a subtle decline: While there were ninety trials lasting
twenty or more days in 1983 and there were 107 in 1988, there have been
fewer than thirty such proceedings every year since 2006, and, remarkably,
there were only thirteen protracted civil trials in all of 2016.23

23. Engstrom, supra note 20. The “shrinking” of federal proceedings is broadly consistent
with research suggesting that federal court judges’ time on the bench is also in decline. See
Jordan M. Singer & William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An Updated Look at Federal
District Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 566 (2014) (presenting evidence
suggesting that, as the years pass, federal judges are spending less and less time on the bench
in open court).
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Figure 2: Number of Civil Trials Lasting Twenty Days or
More in All U.S. District Courts, Combined (1983–2016)
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120
100
80
60
40
20
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

0

Year

A final note is that the above data points to an uptick in short trials and a
reduction in long trials in our federal courts—and this is particularly
remarkable because it defies expectations. A sophisticated observer, in other
words, might expect to see a move toward longer and more protracted
proceedings for at least three reasons. First, as our society grows increasingly
complex, the conventional wisdom is that federal civil litigation is becoming
increasingly complicated.24 Second, over the years, we have seen an uptick
in pretrial motions practice (both motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment).25 An observer might predict that this motions practice
is weeding out suits that are slam dunks (and that might, for example, be
resolved midtrial via a motion for judgment as a matter of law), leaving only
closer and more hotly contested disputes to be litigated.26 Third, and most
24. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 3, at 477, 517 (noting that “[i]t is widely believed that
within the period covered here [from 1965 to 2002], the cases that are tried have become more
complex and consume larger investments of resources” and that “litigation has become more
technical, complex, and expensive”); Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1408, 1411 (1997) [hereinafter The Civil Jury] (recognizing the “growing complexity
of today’s litigation”); Lauren Fajoni Bartlett, From the Virtual Courtroom to the Virtual
Courthouse: Fundamental Considerations for the Modern Lawyer, FOR DEF., Jan. 2010, at
22, 22 (suggesting that, these days, “cases are more complex, the legal issues are more
complicated”).
25. For the uptick in Rule 56 motions, see infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. Rule
12(b)(6) motions are also on the rise, following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). For
discussion and estimates of those cases’ effects, see generally David Freeman Engstrom, The
Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013).
26. On the other hand—and as I discuss below in Part II.B—we might expect that pretrial
motions practice, particularly when it leads to partial dismissal or partial summary judgment,
will weed out some, but not all, claims in complex cases, thus shaving the time necessary to
try them. If so, then the overall effect of pretrial motions practice on trial time across the full
distribution of cases, from simple to complex, could be fully consistent with the observed
trends.

2018]

THE DIMINISHED TRIAL

2137

puzzlingly, over the years, we have seen a sharp rise in the proportion of jury
trials as compared to bench trials: In 1983, the majority (56 percent) of
federal civil trials were conducted without a jury; only a minority (44 percent)
were jury trials.27 But by 2016, that had flipped: 71 percent of trials (1965
out of 2781) were jury trials; a mere 29 percent (816 out of 2781) weren’t.28
This is surprising because evidence suggests that jury trials, which require a
jury to be impaneled and instructed, take far longer than bench trials—
roughly twice as long.29 Yet, even while a higher proportion of trials are jury
trials, a higher proportion of trials are also completed in just one day.
II. WHAT MAY EXPLAIN THE ABOVE TRENDS?
The above suggests that our trials are changing and, in certain respects,
defying expectations. But how, exactly—and why? We cannot definitively
answer either question without conducting detailed empirical analysis.
Lacking that, the discussion below offers tentative hypotheses in an attempt
to generate discussion and pave the way for future inquiry.
A. Change in Inputs: Simpler Cases Are Coming to Trial?
One possibility, admittedly at odds with the conventional wisdom above,
is that outputs are affected by inputs, and we may be seeing a higher
proportion of one-day trials alongside fewer long trials because there may be
a boost in simpler claims. This may or may not be right; much more study is
needed to evaluate the relative complexity of those cases reaching trial. A
good place for such an inquiry to start would be Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, Table C-4, which lists the number of civil cases terminated and
action taken, by case type.30 With this table, one can evaluate how many of
each type of case (such as consumer credit, motor vehicle personal injury,
deportation, and patent) made it to trial in a given year, though, of course, a
great deal of study and analysis would be needed to determine which cases
properly qualify as “simple” or “complicated,” as well as whether the
complexity of a particular kind of case (product liability, say) has changed
over time.31
27. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1983
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.C-4 (1983). There were 11,625 trials in 1983, including
5064 jury trials and 6561 nonjury trials. Id.
28. 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, tbl.C-4. This is consistent with Galanter’s 2004
finding. See Galanter, supra note 3, at 465 (“In the course of the rise and then fall in the number
of federal civil trials, the makeup of these trials changed. More of them are before juries and
fewer are bench trials . . . .”).
29. Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Which Is
Speedier?, 79 JUDICATURE 176, 176 & n.3 (1996) (collecting authority and concluding that
“[t]he available data generally agree that jury trials take about twice as long as judge trials”).
30. See, e.g., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, tbl.C-4.
31. Another possibility might be that the “who” has changed—namely, that a surge in pro
se litigants is affecting the duration of civil trials. I cannot rule that out because the data are
incomplete. But it does not appear that, at least in recent years, there has been an uptick in the
proportion of pro se filings (though it could be that pro se cases are not being filed more often
but, for some reason, are now going to trial at unusually high rates). In 2016, out of 291,851
civil filings, 85,992—or 29 percent—were filed pro se, whereas in 2005, out of 253,273 civil
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B. Pretrial Practice Is Winnowing Down Contested Issues?
A second possible explanation is that pretrial practice may be streamlining
trial. In particular, in 1986, the Supreme Court decided the so-called Celotex
trilogy—three cases that dramatically expanded the issues amenable to
pretrial resolution via summary judgment.32 Thereafter (and, some say, even
before Celotex came down), parties started filing—and judges started
granting—more motions for summary judgment (which disposed of entire
cases) and also partial summary judgment (which disposed of just parts of
cases).33 According to Joe Cecil of the Federal Judicial Center: “Over the
25-year period [from 1975 to 2000], the percentage of cases with one or more
summary judgment motions granted in whole or in part doubled from 6
percent to 12 percent.”34 When the latter motions were granted, judges
effectively took formerly contested issues off the table and winnowed down
the questions that had to be addressed and resolved at trial. This winnowing
may help to explain why we are witnessing an uptick in trials of just one day.
In addition (or maybe, in the alternative), in 1983 and again in 1993, the
Rules Committee beefed up Rule 16 pretrial conferences considerably.35 In
particular, in 1983, Rule 16(c)(1) was added to judges’ playbook. It provides
that, at any pretrial conference, the court can consider the “formulation” and
simplification of issues, including the “elimination of frivolous claims or
defenses.”36 Rule 16(c)(3) was also expanded, to empower trial courts to
consider, and take action with respect to, “the possibility of obtaining
admissions of fact . . . which will avoid unnecessary proof” as well as

filings, 76,314—or 30 percent—were filed pro se. Compare 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
4, tbl.C-13, with ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS,
REPORT
OF
THE
DIRECTOR
88
tbl.S-24
(2005),
2005
ANNUAL
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/s24.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4LTJ-JC59].
32. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–50 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586–88 (1986); see also Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are
the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in
Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984, 1041–49 (2003) (suggesting
that the Celotex trilogy “transformed summary judgment from an infrequently granted
procedural device to a powerful tool for the early resolution of litigation”).
33. See Miller, supra note 35, at 1048–57 (discussing the “greater judicial receptivity” to
motions for summary judgment following the Celotex trilogy); cf. Engstrom, supra note 25, at
1204 n.4 (reporting that the “steepest increase in summary judgment filings and grants came
before the Celotex trilogy, not after”).
34. Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal
District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 883 (2007).
35. For more on the 1983 amendments, see generally ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/1983Amnds.pdf [https://perma.cc/AGE4-RD37].
For the 1993 amendments, see Miller, supra note 32, at 1004 (explaining that the 1993
amendments further “embellished” Rule 16).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(1) (1983); see id. 16(c) advisory committee’s notes to 1983
amendment (explaining that Rule 16(c)(1) “has been added in the hope of promoting efficiency
and conserving judicial resources by identifying the real issues prior to trial, thereby saving
time and expense for everyone”).
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“stipulations regarding the authenticity of documents, and advance rulings
from the court on the admissibility of evidence.”37 These newly invigorated
Rule 16 conferences, and the actions taken therein or thereafter, may be
narrowing claims and inducing parties to stipulate to more facts, which again,
would serve to abridge the zone of legitimate controversy.
C. Anomalies in the Data?
A third possibility is that the above is best explained by oddities in trial
data, as that data is maintained and reported by the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts.
1. More Mid-Trial Settlements?
First, Table C-4, from which the above data are drawn, is not a count of
completed trials or trial verdicts but merely a count of cases terminated
“during or after trial.”38 Thus, a case “counts,” and might appear as a oneday trial in the discussion above, if the parties reach a settlement soon after
the trial gets underway.39 Given that mid-trial settlements are tallied, might
it be that a higher proportion of trials are wrapped up in just one day because,
as the years go by, a higher proportion of civil cases are being resolved soon
after trial commences via consensual settlement?
Maybe. But the scattered data we have suggests not. According to Marc
Galanter, in fact, over time we have seen fewer cases consensually resolved
mid-trial, not more. He reports that, in 1988, 24 percent of federal civil cases
were resolved “during” trial, whereas by 2002, only 18 percent of cases were
resolved “during” the trial proceeding.40 Thus, rather than solving the puzzle,
this settlement wrinkle seems to deepen the mystery.
2. More Non-Trial Proceedings Counted as Trials?
A second possibility, which also arises from quirks in the Administrative
Office’s data, is that Table C-4 tallies not only bona fide trials but, instead,
all “contested proceeding[s] at which evidence is introduced.”41 Given this
expansive definition, Table C-4 counts as “trials” certain events which are
not trials in any traditional sense, such as a contested hearing to determine
whether to issue a temporary restraining order or to qualify an expert against
a Daubert challenge. Owing to this inclusivity, Table C-4 offers a fairly
crude—and generous—indicator of classic trial activity.

37. Id. r. 16(c)(3). For more on these stipulations of fact, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.471 (2004).
38. See, e.g., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, tbl.C-4.
39. See Galanter, supra note 3, at 461 (“The Administrative Office’s Table C-4 . . . is not
a count of completed trials but of cases that arrive at the trial stage.”).
40. Id. at 461; see also id. at 466 fig.3 (illustrating the drop graphically). Galanter
elaborates: “As fewer cases managed to survive until the trial stage, those that began a jury
trial were more resistant to being deflected from pursuing the trial through to its conclusion.”
Id. at 461.
41. Id. at 461.
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How generous? It is difficult to say for sure, though we have an inkling.
Professor Jonah Gelbach has recently completed a rigorous study of federal
civil cases that had docketed trial activity in calendar year 2014. Sifting
through hundreds of thousands of dockets, Gelbach found 1574 federal cases
that had either a bench or jury trial in 2014, whereas Table C-4 reports that
2920 trials (nearly twice as many) were conducted during that same period.42
This is critically important because it points to a serious mismatch between
“real” trials and “reported” trials, and it also helps to explain one-day trials’
popularity (since some of the one-day trials reported above are not real trials
at all).
But while this insight has profound implications,43 it stops short of
unraveling our current mystery. It fails to explain why we are seeing an
uptick in one-day trials (unless we believe that contested hearings are on the
upswing, which is certainly possible but not obvious).44 And it also does
nothing to explain why protracted trials (those of over twenty days) have
become so rare.
D. The Shrinking Jury?
Still another possible explanation is that more trials are now conducted in
front of fewer jurors—another change reportedly associated with greater
speed and efficiency.45
The twelve-person jury was an early and central feature of the American
judicial system. Indeed, the Charter of Jamestown established the twelveperson jury in 1607, and, as early as 1898, the Supreme Court rejected Utah’s
attempt to cut the jury down to size.46 Whereas the Utah Supreme Court had
stated, “There can be no magic in the number 12, though hallowed by time,”

42. Compare Memorandum from Jonah Gelbach, Professor, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., to
author (Oct. 11, 2017) (on file with the author), with ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.C-4
(2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/c04dec14_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R948MEBM].
43. Gelbach’s calculations reveal that we have been overestimating the incidence of
federal trials—and that trials are, in fact, much scarcer than scholars have so far recognized.
44. Here, perhaps the best hypotheses would be that either Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and its progeny have led to more contested
hearings regarding the admissibility of expert testimony or that Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199
(2007), which interpreted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995’s exhaustion requirement,
has led to more contested hearings in the prison litigation context as judges probe whether the
plaintiff-prisoner has successfully exhausted prison grievance procedures.
45. This move from twelve to six jurors has been motivated by a desire to “streamline
civil trials.” The Civil Jury, supra note 24, at 1467; see also Hans Zeisel, . . . And Then There
Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 711 (1971) (“The
reasons presently given for reduction of the size of federal civil juries are to expedite jury trials
and to lessen their cost.”). Some, however, insist that “[o]verall, little court time is saved by
reducing jury size.” Stephan Landsman, In Defense of the Jury of 12 and the Unanimous
Decision Rule, 88 JUDICATURE 301, 303 (2005).
46. The Civil Jury, supra note 24, at 1468–70.
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the Supreme Court disagreed.47 According to the Court: “[T]he wise men
who framed the Constitution of the United States and the people who
approved it were of the opinion that life and liberty, when involved in
criminal prosecutions, would not be adequately secured except through the
unanimous verdict of twelve jurors.”48 The Court then reiterated that position
in 1899, declaring: “we are clearly of the opinion that the word ‘jury,’ in
section 19 of article 1, as well as in other places in the constitution where it
occurs, means a tribunal of twelve men.”49
Yet, in time, the Supreme Court changed its tune. In Williams v. Florida,
decided in 1970, the Supreme Court surprised onlookers by upholding a
Florida statute that provided for six-person juries in all noncapital cases.50
Emboldened by Williams, in the early 1970s, a number of district courts
adopted local rules providing for juries of fewer than twelve in civil cases.51
And a few years later, in Colgrove v. Battin, those actions were tested and
approved.52 From there, in 1991, the Rules Committee essentially codified
Colgrove and amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48 to give judges
discretion to empanel anywhere from six to twelve jurors.53 Exercising this
discretion, some districts specify a particular number of jurors in their local
rules (although that number varies), others provide a range, and still others
vest the choice in the trial court’s discretion.54 Now, with the dust settled, it
seems that the majority of federal civil trials are argued before juries of
between six and eight.55 Since smaller juries are associated with faster
adjudications, that might help to explain some of the fluctuation above.

47. The Utah Supreme Court continued: “Intelligence, impartiality, and integrity are the
qualities that will enable and influence jurors to ascertain and declare the truth. Such a result
does not depend upon any particular number.” State v. Bates, 47 P. 78, 80 (Utah 1896).
48. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 353 (1898).
49. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 15 (1899) (quoting Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St.
167, 179 (1854)).
50. 399 U.S. 78, 79, 102–03 (1970). As the text indicates, the opinion came as a surprise.
See 9B ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2491 (3d ed. 2017) (“Until
June 22, 1970, when the Supreme Court decided the case of Williams v. Florida, no one
doubted that, unless the parties stipulated otherwise, a jury in a civil case in federal court had
to consist of exactly twelve jurors, neither more nor less.”).
51. MILLER, supra note 50, § 2491 (recounting this history).
52. 413 U.S. 149, 149–50 (1973). Subsequently, in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245
(1978), the Court struck down a Georgia law providing for criminal juries of five.
53. See FED. R. CIV. P. 48(a) (“A jury must begin with at least 6 and no more than 12
members . . . .”). Prior to the 1991 amendment, Rule 48 provided: “The parties may stipulate
that the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve or that a verdict or a finding of a
stated majority of jurors shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury.” MILLER, supra
note 53, § 2491 n.8 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 48 (1990)).
54. Thornburg, supra note 18, at 1277–78 (discussing judges’ increasingly active trial
management).
55. The Civil Jury, supra note 24, at 1478. In fact, the Standing Committee recommended
in June 1996 that federal courts ought to return to twelve-person juries, but that
recommendation was rejected. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Twelve-Person Federal Civil Jury
in Exile, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 691, 691 (2013).
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E. Bifurcation?
Another economization technique that may explain some of the above is
judicially ordered bifurcation of complex trials, either to separate liability
from damages or, particularly in mass tort cases, to separate common issues
(such as general causation) from those peculiar to particular plaintiffs.
Expressly permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), bifurcation is
often associated with “expedition and economy” because, if the plaintiff does
not prevail in the first part of the trial, the “later” issue need not be
addressed.56
Historically, bifurcation was limited and rare.57 But now, in many states,
legislation requires courts to split questions of liability from damage
And
determinations whenever punitive damages are at issue.58
commentators assert that bifurcation is becoming more common, particularly
in complex cases, such as those asserting mass tort and intellectual property
claims, as well as suits involving violations of antitrust and environmental
laws.59 Again, more study is needed to determine whether bifurcation is, in
fact, on the upswing and, if so, the precise effect of this development. But it
could be that a move toward slicing and dicing certain claims is fueling some
of the observed trends.
F. Judges’ More Active Trial Management?
Last but not least, influenced by the ethos of managerial judging, trial
judges themselves seem to be taking a more active role in trial processes,
including by imposing time restrictions on opening statements and closing
arguments and imposing strict trial time limits, across the entire proceeding.60
56. Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705, 722 (2000) (declaring
that there is a “clear consensus” that, for certain disputes, “bifurcation offers huge potential
trial savings”); Jennifer M. Granholm & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How TrialSplitting Devices Defeat the Jury’s Role, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 505, 511–12, 537 (1995). This
common-sense prediction was tested and seemingly confirmed in 1963. See Hans Zeisel &
Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Savings: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1606, 1624 (1963) (studying “regular” and “separated” trials and concluding that bifurcation
yielded substantial time savings).
57. Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: The
Prejudicial Practice of a “Reverse Bifurcation” Approach to Punitive Damages, 2
CHARLESTON L. REV. 375, 378–79 (2008) (tracing the relevant history).
58. For a compilation of relevant legislative activity, see BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 618–19 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
59. Gensler, supra note 59, at 725 (reporting that “federal judges regularly employ
bifurcation in complex litigation such as mass tort cases” and that “[b]ifurcation is also
common in patent litigation, complex environmental litigation, antitrust litigation, and
complex employment litigation”); see Ciena Corp. v. Corvis Corp., 210 F.R.D. 519, 521 (D.
Del. 2002) (“[B]ifurcation of complex patent trials has become common.”); accord John K.
Setear, Comments on Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Issues, 69 B.U. L. REV. 765, 778 (1989)
(“The enthusiasm for bifurcation of trials verges on the glowing.”).
60. As Elizabeth Thornburg writes: “Judges can and do impose the same kind of ‘less is
more’ . . . philosophy on trials that they have imposed on the pretrial stage of litigation.”
Thornburg, supra note 18, at 1324. Exhibiting this “less is more” philosophy, some judges
are also known to impose strict time limits on direct testimony or cross-examination. See, e.g.,
Cruz v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 376 F. App’x 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming the trial court’s
imposition of a two-hour limit on certain witnesses’ testimony); Malone v. State Farm Lloyds,
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1. Limits on Opening Statements and Closing Arguments
First, many trial courts now impose strict time constraints on parties’
opening statements and/or closing arguments.61 Unlike trial time limits that
curtail aggregate trial time (discussed below), these à la carte limits have
been around for a long time.62 And, I cannot say whether courts these days
are imposing more or stricter limits than they have in the past. Further study
is needed.
Yet, current limits are certainly notable for their popularity and rigidity. In
a recent suit out of New Jersey, for example, a federal judge limited both the
plaintiff and the defendant to ten minutes for their opening statements.63 In
another “somewhat complicated case” in Florida where sixteen witnesses
testified, the plaintiff was limited to a five-minute opening statement and a
fifteen-minute closing argument.64 And, in a Tennessee medical malpractice
trial in 2011, where the plaintiff suffered catastrophic cognitive injury
allegedly at the hands of the defendants, the plaintiff was limited to “just
twenty minutes” to make her opening statement, even while defendants were
allotted twice that.65
203 F.3d 827, 827 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s placement of a limitation on cross examination of State Farm’s expert).
61. For further discussion of these restrictions, see Thornburg, supra note 18, at 1279,
1285–86.
62. Appellate courts have long emphasized that “a trial judge in the federal judicial system
has wide discretion in such matters as length of counsel’s argument as long as he treats both
sides substantially alike, and does not give one side a preference or advantage over the other.”
Alston v. West, 340 F.2d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 1965); see also Rosiello v. Sellman, 354 F.2d 219,
220 (5th Cir. 1965) (“A trial judge in the exercise of sound discretion may always limit
argument.”); Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Propriety of Trial Court Order Limiting Time
for Opening or Closing Argument in Civil Case—State Cases, 71 A.L.R.4th 130 (1989) (“It is
well settled that the imposition of time limits on the arguments of counsel is within the sound
discretion of the trial court . . . .”).
63. Faulman v. Sec. Mut. Fin. Life Ins. Co., No. 04-5083(AET), 2008 WL 4330188, at *2
(D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2008), aff’d on other grounds, 353 F. App’x 699 (3d Cir. 2009).
64. Maleh v. Fla. E. Coast Props., Inc., 491 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per
curiam) (reversing the trial court after finding that the limits constituted an arbitrary abuse of
discretion).
65. Brief of Appellant at *xviii, Mayo v. Shine, 392 S.W.3d 61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012)
(No. E2011-01745-COA-R3-CV), 2011 WL 6425729; see, e.g., Glenn v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
32 F.3d 1462, 1464 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming, where the district court restricted each side to
ten minutes for opening statements and twenty-two minutes for closing arguments); In re TFTLCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. C 10-4572 SI, 2013 WL 10936486, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
July 11, 2013) (allocating each party “25 minutes for opening statements” and “up to 45
minutes for closing argument” in a six-week antitrust trial); Bullock v. Mount Sinai Hosp. of
Greater Miami, Inc., 501 So. 2d 738, 739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing, where the trial
court limited the plaintiff’s opening argument to five minutes, while the defendant was given
twice as much time). Courts are also imposing strict limits on opening statements and closing
arguments in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 493 F. App’x 515, 521–22 (5th
Cir. 2012) (rejecting the claim that the district court abused its discretion by limiting closing
argument to five minutes per defendant at the conclusion of a three-day trial); United States v.
Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 962–63 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming, where the defendants were allotted
three minutes for opening statements and thirteen minutes for closing argument); United States
v. Roemer, No. 93-4943, 1994 WL 500633, at *4 (5th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) (affirming, where
the “district court limited opening statements by the three defendants to a total of 15 minutes,
allowing Roemer only five minutes to present his opening argument”); Petta v. Cain, No.
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2. Across-the-Board Trial Time Limits
Another way in which judges are taking a more active role—and directly
affecting the length of trials—is by imposing trial time limits and thereby
restricting the length of time one or both parties have to present evidence at
either a bench or jury trial (or trial equivalent).66 Unlike the restrictions
above, these limits curtail the entire trial, not just a part. And they are fairly
new: They were unheard of prior to 1977 and rare throughout the 1980s and
early 1990s.67 But, they got a boost in 1993 when the Rules Committee
revised Rule 16 to authorize trial judges to impose, at any pretrial conference,
an order “establishing a reasonable limit on the time allowed to present
evidence.”68 And, with that official stamp of approval, throughout the 1990s
and 2000s, trial time limits steadily gained popularity.69
Now, it seems that trial time limits are widely used and broadly endorsed.70
Indeed, in recent years, courts have started to experiment with time limits,

CIV.A. 01-3891, 2002 WL 1216619, at *1, 6–7 (E.D. La. June 3, 2002) (denying petitioner’s
habeas corpus petition, where petitioner was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life
imprisonment following a closing argument, where his lawyer was limited to twenty minutes).
66. For more on trial time limits, see generally Engstrom, supra note 18; Patrick E.
Longan, The Shot Clock Comes to Trial: Time Limits for Federal Civil Trials, 35 ARIZ. L.
REV. 663 (1993); John E. Rumel, The Hourglass and Due Process: The Propriety of Time
Limits on Civil Trials, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 237 (1992).
67. The first known time-limited trial was SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 10, 11,
15 (D. Conn. 1977), a massive antitrust case that involved some 30,000 factual allegations.
As of 1986, one commentator correctly observed: “Recent opinions establishing time limits
on trials have broken the barrier of novelty, but strict limits are still rare.” Roger W. Kirst,
Finding a Role for the Civil Jury in Modern Litigation, 69 JUDICATURE 333, 337 (1986).
Likewise, an appellate court noted in 1993 that the limits’ propriety was a “matter of first
impression” and that “[f]or well over a century, trial judges in the Commonwealth, have been
able to control the flow of testimony at trials without the imposition of time limits.” Chandler
v. FMC Corp. 619 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(O). Prior to the 1993 amendment, some judges imposed time
limits, but the source of their authority was murkier. See Engstrom, supra note 18.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 833 F.3d 491, 504 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Imposing
time limits during trial is a growing trend among district courts.”); Maloney v. Brassfield, 251
P.3d 1097, 1101 (Colo. App. 2010) (suggesting that timed trials are increasing); Mark W.
Bennett, Reinvigorating and Enhancing Jury Trials Through an Overdue Juror Bill of Rights:
A Federal Trial Judge’s View, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 481, 500 (2016) (observing that “[h]ard time
limits on the presentation of evidence in jury trials . . . is a growing phenomenon”); William
P. Frank et al., Time Limits Imposed on the Case in Chief, in 4 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 41:5 (4th ed. 2016) (observing that “more and more district
courts are setting time limits on trial”); Andrew L. Goldman & J. Walter Sinclair, Advisability
and Practical Considerations of Court-Imposed Time Limits on Trial, 79 DEF. COUNS. J. 387,
387 (2012) (discussing the “growing trend of imposing time limitations”); Michael L. Siegel,
Pragmatism Applied: Imagining a Solution to the Problem of Court Congestion, 22 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 567, 598 n.132 (1994) (calling the use of trial time limits a “growing trend”); Martha
K. Gooding & Ryan E. Lindsey, Tempus Fugit: Practical Considerations for Trying a Case
Against the Clock, FED. LAW., Jan. 2006, at 42, 43 (“[C]ourts are increasingly . . . impos[ing]
specific limits on the amount of time the parties are allotted to present their case at trial.”).
70. For the fact that time limits are “broadly endorsed,” see Engstrom, supra note 18
(collecting evidence).
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not only in civil suits, but also in criminal cases.71 And on the civil side, time
limits are now being used to limit the duration of both complex and
straightforward trials, in both state and federal court. Offering further
evidence of trial time limits’ growing popularity, I have conducted an
admittedly crude quantitative study on Westlaw, gathering all published and
unpublished state and federal cases that discuss the imposition of trial time
limits.72 That study, while hardly definitive, tends to confirm that the
imposition of trial time limits is sharply on the rise.
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71. See, e.g., United States v. Cousar, No. 06-007, 2007 WL 4456798, at *2 (W.D. Pa.
Dec. 16, 2007) (“Although it may be more common for a district court to impose time limits
in a civil trial, setting time limits in a criminal trial is equally authorized.”).
72. To do this, I started with a search of “adv: trial /6 time /1 limit! % ‘speedy trial,’”
which yielded some 6428 cases prior to 2018. I then reviewed each case to see if trial time
limits were actually imposed. From there, I KeyCited dozens of the cases the search identified
to unearth any cases I had initially missed. Ultimately, this yielded a dataset of 302 cases from
1977 to December 31, 2017. As the text indicates, any empirical study that relies, for raw
data, on Westlaw’s ALLFEDS and ALLSTATE databases must be viewed with caution, as
Westlaw only captures the tip of any litigation iceberg. (This general limitation is apt to be
especially pronounced in this particular context, because trial time limits are often imposed in
pretrial orders, which are not typically published.) Beyond that, when it comes to what subset
of material Westlaw captures, there is bound to be some variation over time and across space,
confounding any effort to identify “trends.” For a discussion of these and other difficulties,
see Engstrom, supra note 25, at 1214–16. The observed rise is, however, in some ways more
remarkable given the well-known biases of what makes it into Westlaw. That is, many believe
that judges are more likely to publish cases that “limn the boundaries” of their authority or
“raise issues of first impression.” Id. at 1215 & n.43. Consequently, we might expect that
judges would have been more inclined to publish decisions imposing or reviewing time limits
back when these restrictions were new and when judges’ authority to impose the restrictions
was uncertain (which was true prior to the amendment to Rule 16 in 1993). Over time, as trial
time limits have lost any claim to novelty—and it has also become clear that restrictions are
not only permissible but also reviewed with great deference—the likelihood that any single
imposition would result in a published decision or even generate an appeal would seemingly
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CONCLUSION
The above discussion suggests that trials are not only disappearing. Owing
to a number of disparate developments, the ones that remain seem to be
shrinking in size.
Now, to the extent judges are the ones orchestrating all this, some might
heartily applaud judges’ handiwork. All the above reforms—including the
increased granting of motions for partial summary judgment, increased
pretrial activity, a reduction in the size of the civil jury, increased bifurcation,
the imposition of time restrictions on opening statements and closing
arguments, and the increased imposition of across-the-board trial time
limits—in one way or another, seem destined to reduce the amount of time
and effort devoted to processing a given case.73 In an era that prizes and
prioritizes efficiency and cost-cutting, some may say that’s a great thing.
Moreover—and returning to where this Article began—some may even
suggest that the above reforms and restrictions are beneficial because they
will (somewhat counterintuitively) help to revive the vanishing trial. The
idea is that some savvy litigants, at least implicitly, compare trials (Door
Number 1) to other available dispute resolution mechanisms, such as
settlement, arbitration, mediation, summary trials, and even voluntary
dismissals (collectively, Door Number 2). To the extent that trials are seen
as unduly cumbersome, time consuming, and expensive, more litigants will
opt for these other alternatives. But, if the above reforms work, and trials are
streamlined and simplified, we might see a renewed interest in—and appetite
for—Door Number 1.74
Yet, many of the above reforms do not merely expedite the resolution of
claims. Many come with negative side effects that also need to be evaluated
and tallied. For example, some of the above reforms (notably, bifurcation
and the imposition of across-the-board trial time limits) are said to slant the
playing field away from plaintiffs and toward defendants, which could affect
the direction and evolution of substantive law.75 Other reforms (particularly
decline. Cf. KATHY D. PATRICK ET AL., S. DIST. OF TEX. JURY INNOVATIONS PROJECT, PILOT
PROGRAM MANUAL 75 (2009), http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/sites/txs/files/PilotProgram
Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TSV-QX2G] (observing that time limits are frequently
imposed but rarely appealed). Thus, the above trend line, which reveals more and more
Westlaw cases discussing or imposing time limits, to my mind, points to genuinely increased
incidence.
73. Even this common-sense assumption may not hold up in all cases. For why trial time
limits may not actually save trial time, for example, see Engstrom, supra note 18. For evidence
refuting the assumption that smaller juries are more efficient, see The Civil Jury, supra note
24, at 1484.
74. Stephen D. Susman & Richard L. Jolly, An Empirical Study on Jury Trial Innovations
2–8 (Nov. 8, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/sdS-rlJ_An-Empirical-Study-on-Trial-Innovations-11.8.16.docx
[https://perma.cc/F52Q-2XNW] (advocating trial time limits as a way to “stem the tide of
America’s disappearing civil jury trials”).
75. AM. BAR ASS’N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 105 (2005),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/american_jury/final_comment
ary_july_1205.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BYW2-3ARR]
(suggesting
that
“bifurcation may dramatically favor one side over the other—in some cases predetermining
the ultimate outcome of the trial”); Engstrom, supra note 18 (suggesting that, depending on
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restrictions on jury size) are associated with greater variability and
unpredictability in case outcomes.76 Others seem destined to impair and
undermine litigants’ sense of procedural justice—the all-important sense that
the proceeding was respectful, meticulous, dignified, thorough, and just.77
Still others vest so much discretion with the trial judge—and offer the judge
so little guidance regarding the proper exercise of that discretion—that they
risk subjecting adjudications to unprincipled, inconsistent, and arbitrary
judicial decision-making.78 At the same time, as judges exercise ever-greater
power, and litigants and jurors exercise comparatively less, we risk departing
from our traditional, adversary roots—a departure which might not
necessarily be bad, but surely merits thoughtful inquiry.79 Last but not least,
certain of the above reforms seem destined to leave probative evidence and
persuasive argument on the cutting-room floor, and, in so doing, threaten to
undermine litigant autonomy and erode decisional accuracy.80
In short, we are witnessing both the disappearance and the downsizing of
the American civil trial. What is fueling this transformation? And, as trials
are abridged, what precisely is gained, and what is lost? To answer these
questions, more study is needed. It should be undertaken carefully, without
preconception or delay.

how time is allocated, trial time limits risk systematically biasing the civil justice system
toward defendants); Granholm & Richards, supra note 56, at 513–14 (collecting empirical
evidence suggesting that bifurcation advantages defendants).
76. Many suggest that a reduction in jury size leads to less predictable and more variable
jury verdicts. See, e.g., Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury
of Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 30–31 (1993) (amassing evidence); The Civil
Jury, supra note 24, at 1484–85 (same).
77. Engstrom, supra note 18 (arguing that trial time limits are apt to impair litigants’ sense
of procedural justice); accord In re Marriage of Ihle, 577 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998)
(concluding that “public confidence in the justice system tends to become tarnished when a
trial concludes without an opportunity for the parties to present all the evidence they believe
to be important”). For more on procedural justice, see Engstrom, supra note 18 (collecting
sources).
78. Engstrom, supra note 18 (arguing that trial time limits are susceptible to unprincipled
and inconsistent application because “[i]t is very doubtful, in the current climate, that two
judges asked to preside over two trials would both impose time restrictions, and, if they did, it
is extremely doubtful that they would allot similar amounts of time, even to similarly-situated
litigants”).
79. As Paul Carrington observes: “The hidden effect of case management is a transfer of
power away from individual parties and their lawyers, and also from juries or appellate
courts . . . .” Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 62 (1997). For
how, precisely, trial time limits effect this transfer, see Engstrom, supra note 18.
80. Granholm & Richards, supra note 56, at 510–11 (suggesting that bifurcation
undermines decisional accuracy); see also McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 115
(7th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that trial time limits may undermine the “accuracy of factual
determination”). It is also said that a reduction in jury size impairs decisional accuracy. See,
e.g., Landsman, supra note 45, at 301 (“[Larger juries] are more likely to produce accurate
results.”).

